Autonomy, information and paternalism in clinical communication by Dive, Lisa Lehrer
 1 
Open Peer Commentary on: 
“Empowerment Failure: How Shortcomings in Physician Communication Unwittingly 
Undermine Patient Autonomy” 
 
Author: 
Dr Lisa Dive 
Research Fellow 
Sydney Health Ethics, University of Sydney 
Level 1, Medical Foundation Building K25 
The University of Sydney NSW 2006 
Australia 
 
Abstract 
While this paper does not explicitly define the concept of autonomy, the way Ubel et al 
describe clinicians’ failures to enhance their patients’ autonomy reflects a broader 
understanding of autonomy than the default account as free and informed choice. In this 
OPC I would demonstrate that the communication strategies the authors recommend 
reflects a more sophisticated conception of autonomy than the understanding that typically 
prevails in bioethics. I will also distinguish between weak and strong forms of paternalism, 
and argue that a weak paternalistic approach is not only defensible but also aligns with the 
strategies the authors propose. Thus, by clarifying the concept of autonomy we can show 
how it can be enhanced in practice. 
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Autonomy, information and paternalism in clinical communication 
 
In their paper “Empowerment Failure: How Shortcomings in Physician Communication 
Unwittingly Undermine Patient Autonomy”, authors Ubel, Scherr and Fagerlin demonstrate 
that physicians often fail to support patients’ autonomy in their clinical interactions. 
Although they do not explicitly define how they understand autonomy, in their discussion of 
how physicians fail to enhance patients’ autonom, the authors presuppose a broader, more 
sophisticated understanding of autonomy than the default conception in medical ethics. 
Furthermore, the improvements to physician communication that they recommend can be 
understood as a weak form of paternalism, which can enhance rather than undermine 
patients’ autonomy. 
This paper initially reflects a common feature of medical ethics, which is to assume a 
“default account” of autonomy as free, informed choice. In their influential Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress (2013) establish three conditions for 
autonomy: intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol.1 This prevailing understanding of 
autonomy is reflected in Ubel et al’s introduction to their paper which illustrates the 
prevalence of “empowerment failure” in clinical practice. The authors seem to understand 
autonomy to be a patient’s right to make their own decisions, or to participate in genuinely 
shared decision-making processes. The features of clinical encounters which fail to 
empower patients fall into two categories: failures of information provision, and failed 
attempts to share decision-making with patients in a meaningful way. In other words, 
clinicians failed to empower patients because they undermined Beauchamp and Childress’ 
                                                      
1 Intentionality means that the decision is made purposefully, not by accident; understanding means that the 
patient has sufficient information and can make sense of it in a way that supports their decision making; and 
noncontrol refers to the absence of manipulation, coercion, or undue influence. 
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second criterion for autonomy, which is to ensure the patient has sufficient understanding 
to make their decision. The authors also reflect the default conception of autonomy in their 
recommendations, in which they suggest that autonomy is about patients having “a say 
about their healthcare choices” (p. 21).  
However, Ubel et al’s explanations of clinicians’ failures to communicate information in a 
way that empowered patients reflects a more sophisticated understanding of autonomy.  
The authors criticized clinicians’ “ethic of information”, their a tendency to provide large 
amounts of information – often according to a “standard ‘spiel’” – which was not tailored 
and responsive to the individual patient. Clinicians were observed to exhibit a need to 
convey a large amount of information to the patient, whether or not the patient desired to 
receive it, and often in a manner that was indifferent to the patient’s emotional state. 
This criticism reflects the misconceptions about communication and the role of information 
that Manson and O’Neill identify in their discussion of informed consent (Manson and 
O'Neill 2007). They argue that the emphasis on providing information in order to respect 
patients’ autonomy via informed consent processes has led to unhelpful ways of thinking 
about information. They describe a “container/ conduit” metaphor which considers 
information to be ‘stuff’ that can be contained in a person or document, and transferred to 
another person. Such a metaphor is misleading, because it obscures the norms that 
underpin communicative exchanges between people. Effective communication is flexible 
and responsive to each participant.  
Some of the communicative interchanges described by Ubel et al are instances of clinicians’ 
failure to adapt their communication style in response to feedback from the patient. For 
example they deliver large quantities of information with little regard to the patient’s 
requirements, they persist in their verbose “standard ‘spiel.’” This reflects a desire to 
 4 
transmit a quantity of information to the patient, instead of a meaningful engagement with 
the patient. The authors identify further failures of communication which include neglecting 
questions for clarification, and ignoring patients’ emotional distress. In these instances the 
emphasis on providing information, rather than responsively adapting communication to 
the situation, undermines patient autonomy. These failures represent a lack of adherence to 
the communicative norms which underpin effective communication, suggesting that the 
authors tacitly subscribe to a broader understanding of autonomy such as I have articulated 
more fully in a forthcoming paper (Dive & Newson, forthcoming). This concept of autonomy 
moves away from a focus on providing maximum information, and emphasizes critical 
reflection on patient values. 
Importantly, the prevailing conception of autonomy as explicated by Beauchamp and 
Childress takes autonomy to be a property of decisions, not of persons (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2013). Focusing on the autonomy of individual decisions leads to undue emphasis 
on informed consent and thereby on the provision of information to patients. However, if 
autonomy is construed more broadly as a property of persons, this allows a more pragmatic 
focus on how clinicians can enhance patient’s capacity to be autonomous (Dive & Newson, 
forthcoming). Dworkin (1988) considers autonomy to be a capacity that involves reflecting 
critically on one’s desires and preferences, and adjusting them in light of their higher-order 
preferences. Ubel et al’s recommendations about “activating patients” and diagnosing their 
preferences support precisely this kind of understanding of autonomy. 
Ubel et al also observe that clinicians fail to recognize the nuances of their interpersonal 
relationships with patients. Donchin emphasizes various relational dimensions of autonomy, 
and of particular relevance here is the interpersonal dimension of the patient-clinician 
relationship, and its inherent power dynamics (Donchin, 2000). Ubel et al illustrate how 
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failures to recognize these dynamics compromise patients’ autonomy, understood as a 
capacity to make decisions that align with their own values. The authors’ recommendations 
consist of strategies that seek to enhance the autonomy capacity of patients, and reflect 
Manson and O’Neill’s account of adaptive and responsive communicative interchanges. For 
example, the recommendations to assess patients’ baseline understanding of the disease 
and engage interactive teaching techniques to ensure understanding describe exactly this 
kind of exchange, which is inherently interpersonal. Furthermore, the recommendation to 
“diagnose” patient’s preferences – rather than merely asking – reflects the requirement to 
engage the patient in a process of critical reflection on what matters to them. 
 
Ubel et al observed that clinicians often exerted undue influence on patients, in “a clinical 
encounter that… at its core, is not very different from old fashioned paternalism” (p. 5). The 
accusation of paternalism – that is, interfering with the liberty of another person for their 
own good –  is clearly intended to be a criticism, but the discussion that follows does not 
support a rejection of paternalism entirely. 
Paternalism2 usually has negative connotations, but as Conly argues, it can have overall 
beneficial effects on people’s lives by helping them to achieve the kind of life they wish to 
live (Conly 2012). By appealing to findings which are well accepted in the fields of 
psychology and behavioral economics, she shows that we are all prone to errors of 
reasoning due to cognitive failures. These errors cause us to make choices that do not 
support us to achieve our long-term goals. They include (among others) a tendency to 
                                                      
2 For the purposes of considering the relationship between autonomy and paternalism, a distinction between 
strong and weak paternalism is useful. Strong paternalism is intervening to override someone’s autonomously-
chosen goals for the kind of life they wish for themselves; by contrast, weak paternalism is overturning a 
person’s (first order) choices in order to help them achieve their autonomously-chosen life goals. 
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discount the future at a rate that is not rational, and a belief that we are less likely than 
others to suffer future misfortune. These known cognitive failures justify (soft) paternalistic 
interventions to help us achieve the goals we value. Levy also argues that given evidence of 
such cognitive errors, a degree of paternalism which constrains the choices available to us is 
justified (Levy 2012).  
One kind of cognitive limitation that Conly describes is a susceptibility to be swayed by the 
way that information is presented to us, particularly in a medical context. An example of this 
is when medical professionals describe treatment options in ways characterized by Ubel et 
al as unreasonably paternalistic, for instance when descriptions of different treatment 
alternatives incorporate the clinician’s value judgements. Ubel et al argue that the challenge 
for clinicians is to present different treatment options as impartially as possible. However if 
the emphasis is on enhancing patients’ autonomy, then the challenge is rather to elucidate 
each individual patient’s preferences and goals, and to present the information about 
treatment options in relation to those goals. 
In the case of urologists’ discussions with patients, this is an area where treatment choices 
are highly dependent on patient preferences – particularly the relative value they place on 
sexual function, incontinence, and likely survival timeframes. Clearly it is essential in such 
situations to ensure that guidance in relation to treatment options is presented with 
reference to the patient’s values and preferences. When the authors say that physicians 
have a role in guiding patients’ decisions but should do so in accordance with the individual 
patient’s values and preferences (p. 19), they are advocating a weakly paternalistic 
intervention. In this way, clinicians should seek to present information that is not value-
neutral, but which makes reference to the specific patient’s values. 
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While Ubel et al do not explicitly define how they understand patient autonomy and appear 
at first to equate the concept with the freedom to make one’s own choices, their discussion 
and recommendations reflect a more sophisticated understanding of autonomy that moves 
away from a focus on information provision, such as that for which we have recently argued 
(Dive & Newson, forthcoming). Their critique of strongly paternalistic communication 
techniques combined with recommendations to engage with patients’ values and 
preferences support weakly paternalistic approaches as a way of enhancing patients’ 
capacity for autonomy. 
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